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Abstract 
 
Throughout Europe, members of the Roma minority are the target of racism and intolerance 
and suffer from widespread social and economic exclusion. This study looks at their situation 
within the context of Europeanization of educational policies in accession countries. While 
the EU has been a strong advocate for improving the position of the Roma in this field, the 
effects on communities on the ground has not met expectations. This study takes a top-down 
approach to the process of Europeanization by examining how the EU as an agent can 
influence the inclusion of the Roma. Drawing on insights from previous enlargement rounds, 
processes of rule transfer and norm implementation are analyzed in two Western Balkan 
states: North Macedonia and Montenegro. Using a qualitative analysis of policy documents 
complemented with quantitative indicators and survey data, this research aims to assess 
whether the presence of conditions enabling these processes can explain the respective (lack 
of) improvements in the educational inclusion of the Roma in these states. It finds support for 
the general expectation that conditions for rule transfer and norm implementation were 
generally unfavorable. However the model seems to be unable to account for the different 
outcomes in Roma educational inclusion between North Macedonia and Montenegro 
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Introduction 
According to a recent report by Council of Europe the Roma constitute the largest, but 
simultaneously one of the most disadvantaged and discriminated against, minority in Europe 
(Council of Europe 2016). Their problems are usually twofold. Firstly, the Roma suffer from 
widespread social-economic deprivation (European Commission 2011a). This was reaffirmed 
in the EU-MIDIS II survey, which found that ‘’80% of Roma [in EU member states] continue 
to live below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold in their country’’ (European Agency for 
Fundamental Rights 2016). Secondly, they are often the subject of racist and exclusionary 
rhetoric in both society as a whole and the political discourse (Council of Europe 2016). The 
most blatant recent example of this might be that of journalist and close ally of the Hungarian 
president Orbán, Zsolt Bayer, who openly stated that ‘’a significant portion of the Gypsies 
[i.e. Roma] are not fit to live among human beings’’(cited in Ram 2014, p.24).   
While this experience has been shared by Roma communities throughout Europe, the 
European Union only became an active advocate for Roma inclusion after the onset of the 
Eastern Enlargement process in the late 1990s. The relative size of the Roma populations in 
the candidate states of Central- and Eastern Europe and the magnitude of their problems 
warranted heightened attention to their situation during the accession processes (Council of 
Europe 2016). This eventually culminated in the introduction of the Framework for National 
Roma Integration Strategies (hereafter FNRIS) in 2011, which prioritized education, 
employment, healthcare and housing issues (European Commission 2011a) Besides pursuing 
internal policy change through the FNRIS, the EU has also provided financial support to 
member states’ for implementing these policies through the European Social Fund (ESF). The 
EU has also used its external relations, by way of membership conditionality, to promote a 
common European approach to Roma inclusion. The process through which countries adopt 
EU rules and practices in a given policy area such as Roma inclusion is commonly referred to 
as Europeanization (Schimmelfennig 2012).        
It is generally agreed that most of the positive steps that have been taken towards 
Roma inclusion can be attributed to this process (Ram 2014, p.16). Yet despite significant 
efforts by the EU, it has been largely unable to contribute to the improvement of the actual 
situation of the Roma in Europe. A 2012 European Parliament report stated that although the 
EU had in some instances provoked policy change, ‘’most of the minority legislation has little 
impact on the Roma’’ (Benedek et al. 2012). Moreover, seven years after it introduced the 
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Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies in 2011, the European Commission 
itself remarked that there was ‘’still limited impact of the framework on the ground’’ 
(European Commission 2018d). In other words, the process of Europeanization is judges to 
have often not led to the desired outcomes in the field of Roma inclusion. 
The specific outcomes under scrutiny here are those in educational inclusion. Despite 
having received substantial attention, there is still a sizeable gap in educational attainment 
between Roma and non-Roma children throughout Europe. Both enrollment and completion 
rates are usually significantly lagging behind those of the rest of the population. While these 
differences are observed as early as pre-primary education, their magnitude increases 
dramatically in secondary and tertiary education. In EU candidate member Serbia only 19 
percent of Roma completed upper secondary education, compared to 93 percent of the non-
Roma population living in the same area (World Bank 2019, p.216).  Progress in educational 
inclusion is exacerbated by the fact that Roma are far more likely to attend special education 
or segregated schools, where they are often taught by underqualified teachers using 
inadequate resources (O’Hanlon 2015, pp.3-7, see also O’Nions 2010). Moreover, these 
differences remain statistically significant after controlling for socio-economic and 
demographic variables, which means that they can at least partly be attributed to 
discriminatory social norms (World Bank, p.113; see also Brüggeman & Friedman 2017; Ram 
2015).  
In looking at the Europeanization of Roma educational inclusion, this study will focus 
on the Western Balkan1 region. These states are of particular relevance to studying the process 
of Europeanization of Roma educational inclusion for two reasons: Firstly they are all 
currently potential or candidate EU member states. This means that the EU has been 
extensively involved in these countries through membership conditionality. Secondly, while 
educational inclusion continues to be a priority issue throughout the region, there have been 
significant differences observed between states in this regard. The recent cross-national 
Regional Roma Survey has singled out North Macedonia (hereafter ‘Macedonia2) and 
Montenegro as most and least successful respectively in tackling Roma educational exclusion 
 
 1 The term Western Balkans is used in the EU-context to describe the group of states in Southeastern Europe that 
had not joined the EU by 2007, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia 
and Serbia.  
2  Before the ratification of the Prespa agreement with Greece in 2019 the country was officially known as ‘The 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’. Because data will be used until 2018 when simply ‘Macedonia’ was used in EU 
and national policy documents, this term will be used in this study 
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(World Bank 2019). This study will aim at explaining these observed outcomes using a 
qualitative analysis of the conditions enabling the process of Europeanization in this policy 
area using a comparative case study of these diverse cases. More specifically, it will look at 
two sub-processes of Europeanization that have been identified in the literature: rule transfer 
and norm implementation. It is expected that differences in these conditions between 
Macedonia and Montenegro can explain the different outcomes of the Europeanization of 
Roma educational inclusion. To measure these conditions, this study will use content analyses 
of EU and national policy documents and combine these findings with data obtained from 
cross-national surveys, datasets and expert opinions  
 To summarize, the research question of this study will be: What explains the inability 
of the EU to improve the educational inclusion of the Roma minority in the Western Balkans 
through Europeanization? On the one hand, answering this question will contribute to our 
theoretical understanding of the importance of specific conditions in determining the 
outcomes of Europeanization. On the other hand, a better understanding of this process also 
has practical implications for the prospect of improving the educational inclusion of the Roma 
in the Western Balkans. If certain conditions are found to be especially important for 
successful Europeanization of Roma inclusion, these could be prioritized accordingly in the 
future. But the results from this research might also tell us about of the normative power of 
the EU in general (Džankić 2019, p.141).  
Literature review 
The literature on the Europeanization of Roma inclusion is part of a larger body of 
literature focusing on the external promotion of minority protection regimes in the European 
context. This research can be divided into two broad categories.  One set of studies has taken 
a bottom-up approach to the Europeanization of minority rights, viewing the EU as a resource 
available to domestic actors (Jovanovic 2014; Cianetti & Nakai 2017). Epistemologically, 
these draw from constructivist approaches in that they criticize the static understandings of 
norms and compliance used by the majority of scholars (Brosig 2012, p.391). With this in 
mind Woll and Jacquot (2010, p.119) have advocated a multi-level approach in order to move 
beyond the rationalist compliance-driven explanations and instead focus on how the EU ‘’has 
been instrumentalized by policy actors to help them stall or advance their reform projects’’. 
This so-called social learning model assumes the logic of appropriateness, determined by the 
identities, values and norms of the actors involved.  In a case study of Estonia and Latvia, 
Cianetti & Nakai (2017, p.287) used this model to demonstrate how the EU ‘’offers valuable 
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discursive tools to minority activists to justify and legitimize their own demands’’. From a 
state perspective, the lesson-drawing model has been used to explain why the Hungarian 
government adopted EU rules regardless of incentives because they ‘’[expected] these rules to 
solve domestic problems effectively’’ (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004, p.668). In 
general, these scholars have used more interpretive methods including interviews and 
discourse analysis. As a result, these approaches have provided valuable insights into complex 
causal processes and have taken into account the interactions between, and perceptions of, a 
broad set of actors.  
Another approach to studying Europeanization has been to analyze the process from a 
top-down perspective. These studies have looked at the compliance of states with, and the 
implementation of, the body of formal EU law and regulations (the acquis communautaire), 
as well as the policy prescriptions made by the European Commission during and after the 
accession process (Ahmed 2010; Toggenburg 2008). Methodologically, these have used a 
content analysis of EU and domestic policy documents or laws to assess the level of 
compliance. Next, variables that might explain a particular outcome would be constructed and 
measured in an attempt to establish correlations. For example, Schimmelfennig (2008, p.932) 
showed that the lack of compliance during the mid-2000s in Serbia, Croatia and Turkey could 
be explained by the condition ‘nationalist sentiments’. In these countries, prevailing 
nationalist tendencies raised the domestic political costs of adopting EU norms to a level 
where it lead to the suspension or postponement of accession negotiations. In general 
however, studies taking this approach found the EU to have considerable potential in 
instigating policy change regarding minority issues when the focus of analysis is on rule 
transfer, i.e. the process of formally transposing EU norms and rules into domestic law 
(Schimmelfennig 2012, p.662, Rechel 2009, p.174). The membership conditions set in this 
area by the EU are not considered to be very constraining to acceding states and when studies 
focused solely on this aspect of the Europeanization, several found a strong influence of the 
EU on the adoption of minority protection schemes in the region (Sasse 2008; Sedelmeier 
2008). However these studies did not directly address issues of implementation.  
This is problematic when trying to explain the Europeanization of minority protection 
because when the supposed outcomes of Europeanization have been analyzed, the EU’s 
record in actually improving the situation of minorities appears less promising. It is widely 
recognized that there has often been a gap between the formal adoption of minority protection 
laws and frameworks and the implementation of these measures in many states (Rechel 2009; 
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Brosig 2010; Sasse 2008). The continuing social and economic exclusion of the Roma 
exemplifies current deficiencies in the implementation of EU norms. Although efforts to 
improve their position have undoubtedly been shaped by the EU, several authors have 
acknowledged that the approach taken by the European Commission has by no means been a 
success (Iusmen 2018; Popova 2019; Ram 2014). While the EU was successful in persuading 
member states to adopt national Roma strategies combating socio-economic exclusion, these 
often had a limited impact on the situation on the ground. To illustrate, when evaluating 
Roma inclusion policies in the case of Serbia, Cierco (2018) found that conflicting norms, 
internal contradictions in EU norms and insufficient administrative capacities seriously 
undermined their effective implementation. 
This implementation deficit has also been observed in the area of education, which has 
been emphasized by the literature as being central to overall inclusion efforts. According to 
Brüggeman and Friedman (2017, p.1) ‘’educational improvements are considered to be at the 
basis of other social inclusion outcomes’’, and as a result ‘’no other policy area has received 
as much political attention’’. Statistical data also shows that while education is the priority 
area in which most progress has been made since the beginning of the Decade of Roma 
Inclusion3 in 2005, improvements are still quite modest (Decade of Roma Inclusion 
Secretariat Foundation 2015). Although the prospect of joining the EU seems to have 
incentivized policy change in this field, implementation has often been either largely absent 
(New 2013, p.182), or been done in such a way that significant barriers to accessing quality 
education for the Roma have persisted (Curcic et al. 2014, p.261). Furthermore, EU 
recommendations appear to have sometimes led to contradictory policies that have supported 
both the inclusion and exclusion of the Roma. For example, Ram (2014, p.27) has 
demonstrated how half-hearted attempts by the EU to address the placement of Roma children 
in segregated special education schools in the Czech Republic has merely led to a formal 
redefinition of the function of these institutions, without any changes in actual practices. 
Similarly, while desegregation has been a main priority for the EU, it has simultaneously 
supported Roma-specific education programmes (Mariushiakova 2015, p.25). 
Most of this research on education as well as EU-Roma engagement in general has 
focused on pre- and post- accession Europeanization in member states that joined in 2004 and 
 
3 The Decade of Roma Inclusion (2005-2015) was an initiative to improve the socio-economic inclusion of the 
Roma in twelve European states, initiated by the World Bank and supported by various international organizations including 
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Open Society Foundations (OSF). 
The European Commission (EC) was only involved as an observer. 
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2007. In contrast, EU Roma policy in the prospective and potential member states of the 
Western Balkans has not yet been thoroughly examined from a theoretical perspective. Their 
position as potential member states (in which the EU is considered to have additional leverage 
through conditionality) means that these cases should be most susceptible to processes of 
Europeanization. At the same time, Roma in these countries are known to ‘’face similar or 
even more serious problems than in many EU member states’’ (European Commission 2011). 
Recent studies by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2019) and Džankić et al. (2019) have 
explored processes of Europeanization in this region in general. However, there have been no 
attempts as of yet to test whether existing theoretical explanations of this process can explain 
the observed outcomes in the specific policy area of Roma educational inclusion. 
 As mentioned, this research will address this gap in the literature by applying these 
theories to Roma educational inclusion in Macedonia and Montenegro to explain the 
differences observed between these cases. The next section will elaborate on the 
conceptualization of Europeanization and what its implications for the theories that will be 
used to examine this process.   
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Theory 
Following Schimmelfennig (2012, p.656), Europeanization in the non-member states of the 
Western Balkans will be understood as ‘the domestic impact of, and adaptation to, European 
[external] governance’. The latter concept in turn refers to the projection of ‘’EU regulatory 
models, institutions and rules of governance beyond the border of formal membership’’. The 
supposed outcome of the process Europeanization is therefore the harmonization of rules and 
practices between the EU and a non-member state, in this case in the area of Roma 
educational inclusion. Therefore it is not equal to simply adopting EU rules, for two reasons. 
Firstly, Europeanization can occur also in absence of formal EU regulation that can be 
translated into domestic law (see Jovanovic 2014). Secondly, as mentioned before, successful 
Europeanization also requires that once EU rules and norms are adopted, they are 
implemented effectively. In short, Europeanization as used in this study refers to a process of 
compliance with EU rules and practices.  
Conceptualizing Europeanization in this manner has three important implications for 
the way in which the research question is answered: First of all understanding 
Europeanization as compliance with EU norms and practices means that the processes under 
scrutiny are the top-down interactions between the EU, domestic policy actors and 
implementation officials in the area of Roma educational inclusion. Therefore, the EU and 
domestic governments are the actors whose behavior is examined. Second, within this 
restricted set of actors, this conceptualization also requires the researcher to select documents 
which contents represent this top-down way of understanding Europeanization. In this case 
these will be formal policy documents dealing with EU accession and Roma inclusion, both 
on the European and the national level. Third, it implies that any explanation of the outcomes 
of Europeanization will require examining the sub-processes of rule transfer and norm 
implementation. 
The remainder of this chapter will outline these two distinct sub-processes that 
constitute Europeanization in more detail. It will be guided by the work of Frank 
Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2004, 2019) and Malte Brosig (2010), who 
developed frameworks outlining the conditions favorable to rule transfer and norm 
implementation respectively. This study will use these general frameworks to examine the 
process of Europeanization in the specific policy area of Roma educational inclusion. 
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Rule transfer 
To explain why states are susceptible to external governance and adopt EU rules, 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) developed the External Incentives Model (EIM). 
Employing a consequentialist logic, this bargaining model assumes that cost-benefit 
calculations influenced by the characteristics of EU conditionality and domestic conditions 
can explain the likelihood of adopting EU norms. In any given policy area, rule transfer from 
the EU to a country will be successful if the benefits of the external incentives outweigh the 
costs of domestic adoption. This calculation is influenced by four conditions. When these 
conditions are more favorable to the process of rule transfer, outcomes on Roma educational 
inclusion should show more improvement.  
Firstly, the more significant the rewards provided by the EU, and the less time until 
these are awarded, the more likely it will be that rule transfer will occur. For EU external 
governance as a whole these can vary from, in ascending order of significance, expertise and 
financial assistance, to trade and association agreements, to full membership (Schimmelfennig 
& Sedelmeier 2004, p.663). The more significant the reward, the more likely it is that the 
benefits outweigh the costs and that rule transfer (and therefore Europeanization) occurs. The 
positive effect of rewards on Europeanization also increases when the EU offers short-term 
rewards for meeting specific sub-conditions. These sub-rewards have proven to be strong 
incentives for adopting EU rules. To illustrate, in the mid-2000s states in the Western Balkans 
swiftly adopted EU standards on border controls when visa liberalization was made 
conditional on doing so (Renner & Trauner 2009, p.455). To sum up, it is expected that in 
cases where the Europeanization of Roma educational inclusion has been more successful; 1) 
the EU offered more significant final rewards, 2) the temporal distance to the payment was 
smaller and 3) there were specific sub-rewards attached to adopting Roma educational 
inclusion measures.  
The determinacy of the EU when trying to transfer a set of rules to a candidate state 
also affects the likelihood of adoption. This condition contains four aspects. Firstly 
governments need clarity regarding the measures they need to take to meet the condition in 
order to be able to consider adoption. Secondly, the odds of rule transfer increase with the 
degree to which a rule has a ‘legalized status’, i.e. it has been officially formulated as a formal 
rule with law-like qualities. Thirdly, the effectiveness of conditionality will be enhanced if the 
EU emphasizes an issue as non-negotiable and crucial for obtaining the reward 
(Schimmelfennig 2019, p.4). In this sense, determinacy signals that countries ‘’cannot avoid 
adopting an EU rule by manipulating the interpretation of what constitutes compliance to their 
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advantage’’ (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004, p.664). Fourthly, governments are 
incentivized to take measures when there is frequent monitoring and feedback by the EU on 
their progress. Therefore, successful rule transfer is enhanced by a specification of 1) the 
conditions and 2) the behavioral implications, 3) a more legalized status of the norms that are 
transferred, 4) the presentation of these actions as essential to receiving the reward and 5) the 
presence of feedback and monitoring mechanisms. Where these conditions were more 
favorable to the Europeanization of Roma educational inclusion, it is expected that higher 
educational inclusion among Roma was observed.      
 The credibility of the advantages offered and the threat to withhold them in case of 
non-compliance is also crucial as it determines whether domestic actors are willing to accept 
the costs attached to norm adoption (Džankić et al. 2019, p.19). This is due to the time-
inconsistency that is inherent to conditionality: the rewards will only be provided by the EU 
after a government has incurred the costs of adoption (Schimmelfennig 2019, p.4). Credibility 
of rewards will increase when there is: 1) a strong internal consensus within the EU on 
enlargement; 2) public support for enlargement in the member states (assuming this will 
partly determine member state behavior); and 3) consistency and coherence in the application 
of conditionality.  The credibility of threats will increase when there is: no credible 
alternative that will provide similar rewards; an asymmetrical relationship between the EU 
and a candidate state; and the costs for the EU of withholding the reward(s) are low. In sum, 
Europeanization of Roma educational inclusion policies is more likely when the rewards and 
the threat to withhold them are deemed credible by domestic policymakers.   
In the end the above conditions are weighed against the costs of adopting EU rules that 
arise from the domestic context. These costs predominantly originate from the political 
sphere, as incumbents might be fearful that adopting rules will cause electoral losses, or that 
key players will use their (formal or informal) veto to block their adoption altogether 
(Schimmelfennig 2019, p.5). In the case of the Roma this would mean that if the public 
opinion is more skeptical towards EU membership and Roma inclusion, or veto-players 
express more negative views on EU accession, rule transfer and therefore the Europeanization 
of Roma educational inclusion should be less likely to happen. 
 
Norm implementation  
The process of norm implementation contains all executive steps and calculations after 
an EU rule has been transferred that link formal policy objectives to the expected outcomes of 
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the Europeanization process: improvements in Roma educational inclusion. To ensure that 
there are no ‘’systematic patters of non-compliance and mal-application of EU law’’ that 
negatively affect this outcome, conditions enabling effective implementation should be 
favorable (Brosig 2010, p.394). Consequentially, cases showing relatively more progress 
towards Roma educational inclusion are expected to exhibit conditions that are more 
supportive to the process of norm implementation. In his assessment of the challenges of 
implementing minority rights in Central and Eastern Europe, Brosig identified four of these 
conditions within the Europeanization process:  
Firstly, the legacy of EU conditionality shapes norm implementation. This condition 
relates to whether the EU can be held responsible for observed implementation deficits. In 
other words, to what degree have national policy strategies been influenced by EU norms and 
rules? Only if domestic policy actors have used EU policy as a guideline for their own 
approach to an issue can ‘Brussels’ be judged to have contributed to existing implementation 
gaps (Brosig 2010, p.395). Apart from determining who is responsible for this deficiency, the 
influence of EU prescriptions on national policies can also explain the extent to which Roma 
inclusion policies are implemented. When national Roma strategies were drawn up with the 
accession process in mind and referenced the norms and rules prescribed by the EU, domestic 
actors should have more incentives to effectively implement them. Therefore, it is expected 
that a strong influence of the EU on national policy documents addressing Roma educational 
inclusion will increase the odds of effective implementation and thereby Europeanization of 
Roma educational inclusion.         
 Secondly, in addition to the specificity addressed earlier, the quality of the norms that 
are being transferred is important: prescriptions must be clear and unambiguous. Vague 
formulations and unclear definitions can leave too much room for discretion to state and local 
governments. This can cause distortions in the implementation process, especially when 
executives do not share a normative commitment to a cause with the EU. When specific 
solutions and targets for measuring progress are offered regarding the educational inclusion of 
the Roma, implementation of related policies is expected to be more successful.  
 The third condition for effective norm implementation identified by Brosig (2010, 
p.395) is normative resonance: congruence between the international norms that are being 
transferred and the dominant norms held by society. An absence of such alignment can create 
implementation deficits, even when EU norms have already been transposed into national 
law. Whereas the cost-benefit calculation for rule transfer is made by the central government, 
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implementation often requires support from local authorities and the general public. But if at 
this level negative perceptions of the Roma persist, actors are not incentivized to make sure 
official policies are implemented effectively. The EU norm that is contested in such instances 
is that of non-discrimination and therefore the research will focus on analyzing norms and 
attitudes that legitimize discriminatory practices against the Roma. This will be done by 
examining public attitudes towards Roma inclusion in general and educational inclusion 
specifically. If the analysis were to find a larger misfit between these attitudes and the EU 
norm of non-discrimination it is expected that the intended outcome of the Europeanization 
process, Roma educational inclusion, will have improved less.     
 Finally, even if the above conditions are all conducive towards norm implementation 
in a given state, non-compliance with Roma inclusion practices can still occur if domestic 
administrations lack the capabilities to transform these norms into practice. If relevant 
executive authorities and educational institutions are not adequately funded or sufficiently 
staffed, or if they lack the technical expertise needed to carry out their tasks, implementation 
deficits are more likely. This can be the case at the state level, but is also observed in regional 
and local authorities tasked with implementing the policies made by the center. Therefore it is 
expected that higher administrative capacities will be observed in the cases with higher 
outcomes in Roma educational inclusion (i.e. more successful Europeanization).   
To conclude, it is expected that in the cases where the Europeanization of Roma 
educational inclusion has been more successful (based on indicators elaborated upon in the 
next chapter), the conditions described above will be observed to be more favorable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
Method  
Research design  
Explaining why the EU has been largely unsuccessful in improving Roma educational 
inclusion and what can account for differences herein between cases requires a qualitative 
analysis of the processes of rule transfer and norm implementation. To this end, a comparative 
case-study of Europeanization of Roma educational inclusion in two Western Balkan states 
will be conducted. The rationale here is that a multiple case-study generally ‘’puts the 
researcher in a better position to establish the circumstances in which a theory will or will not 
hold’’ (Bryman 2016, p.67). This is relevant in this instance because the aim of this study is to 
test whether the theories of rule transfer and norm implementation as part of Europeanization 
can explain the differential outcomes in educational inclusion in the cases under scrutiny. 
Comparing two cases then allows for a better judgment of which conditions are important for 
successful Europeanization. This in turn increases the external validity of the research, as it 
decreases the likelihood that the overall results will be skewed by exceptional conditions in a 
single case. In other words, the comparative method allows us to generalize the findings 
beyond the research context with more confidence than when using a single-case study. At the 
same time, limiting the analysis to two cases preserves the ability to study the conditions for 
Europeanization in detail within the available time and space for this research. The selection 
process for the countries selected, Macedonia and Montenegro, will be outlined in the next 
section. 
 
Case selection 
The countries of the Western Balkans are listed in Table 1, along with their respective 
Roma populations and progress in the EU accession process. First of all, the states that have 
not been awarded candidate status by the EU, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, were 
excluded. This was done because official candidacy coincides with the (potentially) most 
intensive part of the Europeanization process, epitomized by the publication of annual 
progress reports (see ‘data selection and analysis’). 
 Secondly, in order to allow for a meaningful cross-case comparison of 
Europeanization processes, Croatia is not eligible for this study. It acquired formal 
membership in 2013, which means that observed differences during the accession process 
might be the result of changes over time in the EU approach to Roma (educational) inclusion. 
 Of the remaining countries, Macedonia and Montenegro were selected for this 
research as they relate to the general population as diverse cases. Gerring (2008, p.650) has 
16 
 
described the process of selecting such cases as a ‘’case-selection strategy [that] has as its 
primary objective the achievement of maximum variance along relevant dimensions’’. In this 
research the relevant dimension is the supposed outcome of Europeanization: improvements 
in Roma educational inclusion. Macedonia and Montenegro were selected because they 
represent the respective highest and lowest value on this variable. Moreover, overall 
educational attainment in Montenegro was lowest in 2017 when compared to other Western 
Balkan states, making its limited progress even more significant. These judgments were based 
on the number of education indicators of the 2011 and 2017 Regional Roma Survey in which 
statistically significant increases were observed (World Bank 2019, p.219). A complete 
overview of these indicators can be found in Appendix A.     
 These survey results showed significant improvements on five out of seven education 
indicators in Macedonia. Both compulsory education enrollment (from 73 to 78) and 
completion rates (from 57 to 70) increased substantially. Furthermore, upper secondary 
education completion rate more than doubled from 15 to 32 percent, the percentage attending 
special schools decreased, and Macedonia was the only country were a significant increase in 
tertiary education completion rate was observed. In Montenegro, only pre-primary (from 9 to 
21) and compulsory enrollment rates (from 56 to 62) increased significantly. Completion rates 
were unchanged among all levels of education. As a result, of all Roma children only 43 
percent completes compulsory education, only 3 percent upper secondary education, and not 
even 1 percent tertiary education.      
Table 1. 
Relative size of Roma populations and progress made in the EU accession process in the countries of 
the Western Balkans 
  EU accession process 
Country Relative of size 
Roma population1 
Candidate 
status granted 
Negotiations opened Joined 
Albania 3.6% 2014 - - 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
1.7 % - - - 
Croatia 0.8% 2004 2005 2013 
Kosovo 2.1% - - - 
Montenegro 3.2% 2010 2012 - 
Macedonia 9.6% 2005 - - 
Serbia 8.3% 2012 2014 - 
Source: Council of Europe (2012); European Commission (2019). European Neighbourhood Policy and 
Enlargement Negotiations (webpage), accessed from https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/countries/check-current-status_en 
1 Compared to the total population, based on the mean estimate of Roma populations. The Council of Europe 
uses estimates because disaggregated census data is often either absent, outdated, or severely underestimating the 
size of Roma populations 
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Data selection and analysis 
The nature of the different conditions examined in this analysis requires the selection 
of data from an array of sources and formats including publicly available EU- and national 
policy documents, expert opinions and datasets (see Appendix B for a complete overview of 
the data used per condition including why these sources were selected). For some indicators, 
‘general’ sources (i.e. not concerning Roma inclusion) were used, as the framework contains 
conditions not directly related to Roma inclusion such as ‘added value to the EU’ and ‘sunk 
costs’ when determining the credibility of EU conditionality. For analyzing the policy 
documents and expert opinions, this study will predominantly rely on the method of content 
analysis. This meant creating categories representative of the presence of a certain condition 
and subsequently searching for these in the texts. For the datasets, the selected indicators were 
critically assessed on measurement validity for the conditions they were used for. These 
methods of data analysis are elaborated upon for each relevant condition in Appendices C-I. 
The data values obtained for each indicator from these content analyses, surveys and 
statistics were coded as either ‘low’, ‘low/medium’, ‘medium’, ‘medium/high’, ‘high’. 
Because high values on some indicators, such as those for ‘adoption costs’, correspond with 
less expected Europeanization, codes were subsequently transformed to show how favorable 
they were to the Europeanization of Roma educational inclusion.  As a result indicators for 
each condition were classified as either ‘unfavorable’, ‘slightly unfavorable’, ‘neutral’, 
‘slightly favorable’ or ‘favorable’ to this process.  
The time period for which data will be collected is 2011-2018. The starting point was 
decided by taking the first full calendar year in which both countries were simultaneously EU 
candidate member states. For the cases considered this was 2011, after Montenegro was 
granted candidacy in 2010. Macedonia had already been an official candidate since 2005 at 
that point. This choice was motivated by the observation that EU involvement with these 
states significantly increased after this happened, and Progress Reports (also addressing 
issues of Roma inclusion) were issued annually. It is therefore assumed that Europeanization 
will be most visible during this time period. An exemption was made for national policy 
documents which were drawn up before the official candidacy but were still in effect at that 
point. As changes in the conditions analyzed are assumed to not have an immediate effect on 
Roma educational inclusion, data was collected up to 2018. Therefore, recent developments 
such as the refusal of the European Council to open negotiations with Macedonia in 
November 2019 were not taken into account. 
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Operationalization 
The operationalizations of these indicators are based on those used by Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier (2004, 2019) and Brosig (2010). Additional indicators were added in some 
places if deemed necessary in order to capture the full scope of a condition. All indicators and 
the sources used to measure them are presented in Table 2. A more extensive discussion of 
these operationalizations can be found in Appendices C-I 
 
Table 2. 
Operationalization of conditions for Europeanization of Roma educational inclusion. 
Process Condition Operationalization (data source)  
Rule transfer Significance of rewards - Final rewards of engagement with EU 
external governance as expressed by the 
European Commission (EU Western Balkans 
strategy) 
- Presence of intermediate rewards for 
meeting specific sub-conditions (Progress 
Reports) 
- Proximity to accession (EU Western Balkans 
strategy & Progress Reports) 
Determinacy - The specificity of conditions states have to 
meet to receive the reward (Progress reports, 
FNRIS) 
- The specificity of the behavioral 
implications of the conditions (Progress 
reports, FNRIS) 
- Legalized status of norms in EU law 
(Progress reports, FNRIS) 
- EU feedback on, and monitoring of, the 
measures taken towards the goal (Progress 
Reports) 
- Salience for EU accession of a specific 
condition for the EU: usage of words such as 
‘crucial’, ‘essential’; stressing that condition 
is non-negotiable (Progress Reports) 
Credibility of rewards - EU internal consensus on enlargement, 
measured by: 
o  a favorable opinion by European 
Council1 and European Commission 
(European Council conclusions, 
Commission press releases)  
o public support for enlargement in 
EU member states (Eurobarometer) 
- Coherence and consistency in providing and 
withholding rewards  
 of threats - Cross-conditionality: presence of other 
international actors providing rewards for 
incompatible conditions  
-  Lack of bilateral alternatives for state 
measured in dependency on trade with, and 
financial assistance from, the EU. (European 
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Commission 2019b) 
- Added value to the EU (European 
Commission 2019b) 
- Sunk costs as measured by total allocated 
pre-accession funds (European Parliament 
2018) 
Adoption costs - Risk of electoral losses as measured by the 
public opinion on EU membership and 
Roma Inclusion in education (Balkan Public 
Barometer, Eurobarometer) 
- Public opinion on proximity accession 
(Balkan Public Barometer) 
- Presence of veto-players that can block 
government decision on policies (Manifesto 
Project) 
Norm 
implementation 
Legacy of EU 
conditionality 
- National Roma strategies contain : 
o Influence of EU on strategy 
▪ mention of influence EU 
▪ mention of influence EU 
accession process 
▪ reference to EU policy 
documents 
o Reference to EU norms on Roma 
educational inclusion 
o Reference to FNRIS targets on 
Roma educational inclusion 
(National Roma strategies) 
Quality of norms - EU norms contain:  
o clarity in formulations and 
definitions 
o little discretionary room  
o no escape clauses 
(FNRIS & Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union) 
Normative resonance - Public opinion on Roma educational 
inclusion. (Balkan Public Monitor) 
- ECRI mentions of discrimination towards 
Roma, both in general and in 
education(ECRI Reports) 
 Administrative capacity - Scores on the Government Effectiveness 
index (Worldwide Governance Indicators) 
1 While the Commission is the EU body mandated with the accession negotiations with candidate members, each step of the 
process has to be approved unanimously by the European Council. 
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Results 
To avoid the unnecessary duplication of results in instances where observations were identical 
or very similar, results are presented firstly on the conditions they represent and secondly on 
the respective cases they belong to.  
Rule transfer 
Rewards 
 As expected from the fact that both countries were official candidate member states 
during the period analyzed (2011-2018), there were few meaningful differences found that 
could account for the observed differences in Roma educational inclusion. This is a result of 
the fact that the theories used can be applied beyond countries that are subject to the same set 
of conditions as is the case for Montenegro and Macedonia. For both of these countries the 
final reward (full EU membership, see European Commission 2003, 2011b, 2011d) was high, 
while there were no intermediate rewards found relating to improvement in Roma inclusion 
(European Commission 2011b, 2011d, 2018c).  Only regarding the proximity of the rewards 
were two small differences observed. Firstly, the EU has already opened negotiations with 
Montenegro on 32 of the 35 chapters of the acquis, while negotiations with Macedonia had 
not started by 2018. Secondly, in 2014 European Commission president Juncker mentioned 
that he was unable to present a timeline for the accession process, leaving the speed at which 
rewards will be received indeterminate. However, the 2018 Enlargement Strategy stated that 
Montenegro could join the EU by 2025, but also that ‘this perspective is extremely ambitious’ 
(Juncker 2014; European Commission 2018c). Nevertheless, recalling the similarities on the 
other two indicators of this condition, it was deemed to be overall similarly favorable to the 
improving Roma educational inclusion through Europeanization in both cases.   
Determinacy  
 Two chapters of the acquis were invoked in relation to Roma educational inclusion in 
North Macedonia and Montenegro. Chapter 19: ‘social policy and employment’ deals with 
the ‘’minimum standards for labour law, equality, health and safety at work and non-
discrimination. The broader respect for fundamental rights in law and practices is enshrined in 
chapter 23: ‘judiciary and fundamental rights’. It is therefore clear that Roma inclusion has 
been a condition for joining the EU. However, the specificity of the conditions regarding 
Roma educational inclusion that were mentioned in the Progress Reports dealing with 
countries’ compliance with these chapters was low. While in both cases the Commission 
mentioned the need for overall access to quality education (European Commission 2016a) and 
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insisted that governments ought to take measures to reach this goal (European Commission 
2016b), there was no indication of when these efforts would be deemed sufficient for 
accession. If we accept that the FNRIS sets out the overall goals for Roma integration within 
the European context, the conditions might become clearer. The Framework states that: 
 ‘’Member states should, as a minimum, ensure primary school completion. They should 
also widen access to quality early childhood education and care and reduce the number of 
early school leavers from secondary education […]’’ (European Commission 2011a, p.5) 
However, the FNRIS is in essence not an accession document, and its importance for 
acquiring membership is dependent on whether EU policymakers and domestic governments 
interpret it to be a condition for joining the EU (see also ‘credibility’). Therefore, the 
specificity of conditions is judged to be low to medium. Regarding the specificity of 
behavioral implications, the Framework mentioned specifically that potential member states 
ought to align their national Roma integration strategies with its goals in mind (European 
Commission 2011a, p.12). Moreover, states should 1) identify disadvantaged micro-regions or 
neighbourhoods, 2) allocate sufficient funding, 3) include strong monitoring methods, 4) 
cooperate with Roma civil society, and 5) appoint a national contact point for Roma 
integration. However, in the progress reports most recommendations failed to move beyond 
stressing that more efforts are needed regarding Roma inclusion and that appropriate 
resources should be allocated. Mentions of specific policies or actions were usually absent. 
The only notable exceptions were found in the 2018 report for Macedonia, when the 
Commission mentioned that ‘’Roma health and education mediators must work better’’ 
(European Commission 2018b, p.33), and in the 2011 Progress Report for Montenegro, when 
it was remarked that ‘’scholarships and other forms of financial support available for RAE 
students need to be strengthened’’ (European Commission 2011b, p.20). The results of the 
content analysis this judgment was based on can be found in Appendix D.  
 The legalized status of the conditions can be considered low for both cases as well. 
Although respect for the rights of persons belonging to minorities is mentioned in Article 2 of 
the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), and Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (CFR) specifically lists ‘ethnic and social identity’ as grounds on which discrimination 
is prohibited, these hardly amount to formal ‘rules’ (Benedek 2012, p.28). The same applies 
to the aforementioned Council Directive 2000/43 on anti-discrimination on which most Roma 
inclusion measures are based. As a consequence, there are also no formal sanctions for EU 
members whose efforts towards Roma educational inclusion are insufficient.  
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 Feedback occurs on a regular basis through the Progress Reports, in which Roma 
Inclusion has consistently been mentioned for both Macedonia and Montenegro. While this 
does not directly correlate with quality of feedback, it can be classified as ‘high’ with regards 
to the External Incentives Model. Conditions for effective monitoring were less favorable in 
the cases examined. Apart from the EU-sponsored Regional Roma Survey, the Commission 
has no independent instrument for detailed monitoring of progress made towards Roma 
educational inclusion. The Regional Cooperation Council, which is also supported by the EU, 
offers stricter monitoring in that it presents reports on the progress made on specific policy 
initiatives. However these accounts and interpretations are self-reported by the respective 
governments, and were not directly referenced in the Progress Reports. To conclude, feedback 
and monitoring has been medium to high in both cases.     
 The salience of the conditions for the accession process was also determined using the 
content analysis of Progress Reports presented in Appendix D. In Macedonia, on average 
three paragraphs were dedicated to Roma inclusion in general and two to educational 
inclusion specifically. While the former was consistent throughout the years, the latter showed 
a notable increase towards the end of the period examined. Regarding the use of determinant 
language, the Commission regularly stressed that things ‘need to be done’ or that the 
government ‘should improve’ on certain aspects. However, it did not explicitly state the 
necessity of compliance for the prospect of EU accession. Only in 2018 did the Commission 
emphasize the importance of Roma educational inclusion by stating that ‘’Roma enrollment in 
pre-school education is low and must become a priority’’ (European Commission 2018b). In 
reports on Montenegro (5 times), Roma inclusion in general was on average mentioned more 
often than in Macedonia (4 times) while the amount of paragraphs dedicated to educational 
inclusion was on average equal (2.1). Nevertheless, the language used was slightly less 
determined than in Macedonia, both in terms of frequency and in terms of stressing the 
urgency of the conditions. In sum, the salience for the EU appears to have been slightly higher 
in the case of Macedonia, although the difference might be insignificant.  
Credibility  
The promise of the EU to pay the reward once membership conditions are met is first 
of all based on the EU internal consensus on enlargement. Although the European 
Commission has recently reaffirmed its commitment to further enlargement (European 
Commission 2018c), comments made by President Juncker in 2014 can be considered to have 
undermined the credibility of this statement. Juncker stated that ‘’the EU needs to take a break 
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from enlargement to consolidate what has been achieved among the 28 [member states]’’ 
(Juncker 2014, p.12). The point here is that what ‘consolidation’ entails is not further 
specified, which means that this argument could be used indefinitely if concerns over the 
functioning of the EU are to persist. Regarding the credibility of EU members’ promise to 
approve of membership applications on which the Commission has delivered a favorable 
opinion, conditions were similarly unfavorable. Firstly, the year 2011 marked the first time 
when a majority (53 percent) of the public in EU member states was opposed to further 
enlargement (European Commission 2011c). While this figure decreased to 45 percent in 
2018, there is still no plurality in favor of extending membership to more countries (European 
Commission 2018d, see also Appendix E). The assumption that this directly influences 
governments’ decisions on membership applications can be challenged, knowing that Croatia 
acceded in 2013 without a majority of the European public supporting enlargement. However, 
recent calls for referenda on future enlargement in several EU member states and its 
introduction in France have made it even less likely that a state can accede without majority 
public support (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2019). Secondly, the European Council has on 
several occasions rejected the opening of negotiations with Macedonia based on objections by 
Greece over the ongoing name dispute between the countries (European Council 2018). This 
had no substantial basis in the official membership conditions as outlined in the acquis. 
Therefore it can be seen as a warning that compliance with all formal requirements set out by 
the Commission might not suffice for joining the EU.     
 The coherence and consistency in applying conditionality, i.e. whether improved 
Roma inclusion is a necessary condition for accession, seems high when analyzing public 
statements made on the issue. EU commissioner Johannes Hahn said in 2016 that ‘’Roma 
integration is an important part of the enlargement process. Before accession, countries will 
need to prove tangible results in the fields of education […]’’ (Regional Cooperation Council 
2016). Statements such as these are likely to have informed the public opinion similarly in 
both of the cases examined. In 2017, 66 percent of respondents in Macedonia and 64 percent 
of respondents in Montenegro assessed the issue of Roma integration as either ‘important’, 
‘very important’ or ‘highly important’ for EU accession (Regional Cooperation Council 2019, 
see also Appendix E2). While this does not directly imply that people will support all Roma 
inclusion measures if they judge EU membership to be positive, it shows that at least the 
public seems to believe that progress in Roma integration is necessary for receiving the 
reward. However, the credibility of such statements by the Commission has once again been 
weakened by the accession of Croatia in 2013 without having achieved significant progress in 
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Roma inclusion. In sum, the credibility of promise to pay the reward once conditions 
(including those regarding Roma inclusion) were met was low to medium in Macedonia and 
medium in Montenegro. 
The threat to withhold membership, or to stall the accession process indefinitely, is 
shaped by the highly asymmetrical relationship between the EU and the Western Balkans in 
general. To start, the added value to the EU of having Macedonia and Montenegro is minimal, 
at least in economic terms. The gross domestic product (GDP) of North Macedonia in 2017 
was only 0.06 percent of the combined GDP of all EU member states. Free trade benefits are 
also negligible, with only 0.2 percent of EU trade in that year being conducted with the 
country. For Montenegro, this indicator was even less favorable, with its GDP being 0.02 
percent of that of the EU total and member states’ trade only accounting for 0.03 percent of 
the total (European Parliament 2018, 2018b; European Commission 2019b).  
 The sunk costs of the accession process were also higher in Macedonia, theoretically 
decreasing the threat to withhold membership. Since 2007, the EU has allocated 1.23 billion 
Euros in pre-accession funds to the government of North Macedonia. Montenegro received 
523 million Euros during that same period. Therefore, the threat to withhold membership 
should be higher in Montenegro (European Commission 2019c, 2019e).  
 Bilateral alternatives and cross-conditionality are two factors that do not determine 
the chance of the EU withholding the reward per se, but rather the impact this would have on 
the candidate states. Macedonia was in its foreign trade highly dependent on the EU, to which 
it exported 82 percent and from which imported 62.4 percent of total goods. Of the bilateral 
alternatives for trade identified earlier, only China (3.5) and Turkey (3.2) amounted to more 
than one percent of total trade. This means that there are few viable alternatives to the benefits 
that economic integration with the EU would offer. Montenegro is less dependent in this 
sense, but for exports (45 percent) and imports (48.6 percent) the EU accounts for twice as its 
second biggest trading partner, Serbia (European Parliament 2018, 2018b). Montenegrin trade 
with Serbia (25.1 percent) actually accounts for a large part of the difference in EU 
dependency with Macedonia. Regarding cross-conditionality, it is assumed that when full 
membership is promised (including access to the EU internal market), there are no other 
international organizations able similar rewards to lower costs.    
 In conclusion, the credibility of both receiving and withholding the reward was 
slightly higher in Montenegro. The theory would predict that this enhances rule transfer in 
Montenegro more than in Macedonia. Nevertheless, this condition was generally not very 
favorable towards the Europeanization of Roma educational inclusion in either country. 
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Adoption costs 
 The risk of electoral losses resulting from adopting Roma educational inclusion 
policies was rather low in both cases when looking at the level of support EU membership. 
An overview of the survey data supporting this claim and its interpretation can be found in 
Appendix E3/4. In Macedonia, on average 84.5 percent of the public thought EU membership 
would either be a ‘good thing’ or ‘neither good nor bad’, a figure which was relatively stable 
across time. Opposition to EU membership averaged 14.4 percent during that same period.  
When asked the same question, respondents in Montenegro expressed slightly less support for 
EU membership, with 76.1 percent thinking that membership was a ‘good thing’ or ‘neither 
good nor bad’. The difference between the two countries can partly be accounted for by the 
larger percentage of respondents who did not know how, or refused, to answer the question, 
as on average only 16.7 percent saw joining the EU as a ‘bad thing’ (Regional Cooperation 
Council 2019). According to the theory this indicates that a large part of the public is willing 
to support policies contributing to EU accession in both of the cases examined.  In 
comparison conditions were slightly more favorable in Macedonia.   
 However, the theory sees public attitudes on the benefit of EU membership as having 
an interaction effect with the public opinion on the proximity of accession. In other words, the 
public will be more likely to incur the inevitable costs that arise from the adoption of EU 
Roma educational inclusion policies if the reception of the reward is nearer. The survey data 
from the relevant Balkan Public Barometer indicator are presented in Appendix E5. As might 
have been expected from the fact that the EU has yet to open negotiations with Macedonia, 
the percentage of Macedonians who believed accession would happen by 2020 was 24 
percent in 2015, while this was 33 percent in Montenegro. Although the aggregated data 
shows that this difference disappears when looking at the percentage thinking accession 
would happen by 2030, this was deemed to be too distant to influence the calculation in the 
way prescribed by the theory. Moreover, over the period covered by the survey (2015-2018) 
the percentage of people expecting accession to never happen was higher in North Macedonia 
(Balkan Public Barometer 2019). In conclusion, while support for EU membership was 
slightly higher in North Macedonia than in Montenegro, less people expected it to happen in 
the near future. Therefore this condition is judged to be medium for both cases.  
 The analysis found no presence of veto-players who openly questioned the merits of 
EU membership, and as a result might obstruct the adoption of EU Roma policies and norms, 
in either of the cases. Macedonia has a presidential system, which means that there is an extra 
veto player able to block the adoption of policies when compared to Montenegro, where only 
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government coalition parties were considered. An overview of the relevant indicators derived 
from the analysis of electoral manifestos by the Manifesto Project can be found in Appendix 
C1/2. In Macedonia members of both VMRO-DPME-led coalitions between 2011 and 2016 
as well as the opposition SDSM coalition which took over government in 2017 expressed no 
negative views towards the EU in their election manifestos. During the entire period analyzed, 
the presidency was held by Gjorge Ivanov of the VMRO-DPME. The ‘Coalition for a 
European Montenegro’ which governed Montenegro between 2009 and 2016 showed a 
similar lack of negative attitudes towards the EU. So did the coalition dominated by the 
Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) which governed from 2016 onwards. The results 
therefore show that veto-players in both cases would not, at least based on their manifestos, 
have blocked the adoption of Roma educational inclusion measures because of a negative 
attitude towards EU accession. When positive attitudes were analyzed however, it was found 
that the coalition governments in Macedonia expressed these less frequently than in 
Montenegro. Judging by the dominant party in each coalition, scores for the former were 
1.043 (2011), 0.715 (2014) and 1.515 (2017), while in the latter these were 8.929 (2009), 
1.504 (2012), and 5.222 (2016) (Manifesto Project 2019). If we were to extend this indicator 
to also capture these pro-European sentiments, conditions were more favorable to the 
adoption of EU norms in Montenegro, and therefore the Europeanization of Roma educational 
inclusion.  
 
Norm implementation 
Legacy of conditionality 
 The analysis of their respective national Roma strategies showed that the governments 
of  Macedonia and Montenegro have referenced the EU to a different degree. These findings 
are presented in Appendix G. In case of Macedonia, both strategies explicitly mentioned that 
they were drawn up with the EU in general, and accession specifically, in mind. For example, 
in 2004 it was confirmed that:  
‘’[…] the preparation of the Roma Strategy of the Republic of Macedonia derives 
from its aspirations for membership to the European Union’’ (Republic of Macedonia 
2004, p.4). 
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 Moreover, EU policy documents were regularly invoked as either a normative or legal 
underpinning of the strategies, both in terms of allocated paragraphs as well as the number of 
different documents referenced (7 in 2004, 15 in 2014). These included a wide variety of acts 
such as EU treaties, European Council conclusions and recommendations, and Commission 
strategies and communications (Republic of Macedonia 2004, p.14). Concrete policy 
prescriptions from the Commission on educational inclusion were mentioned three times in 
the 2014-2020 strategy, but only once in the strategy that was published in 2004. This can 
most likely be accounted for by the fact that the FNRIS, the first comprehensive EU strategy 
on Roma inclusion, had not been introduced yet at that time. Remarkably however, even the 
strategy which was published after the FNRIS in 2011 contained no explicit reference to the 
only specific target set out in that document: that all Roma children should at least complete 
primary school.          
 On the contrary, reference to this specific norm was made to by the Montenegrin 
government in its strategy for 2016-2020. In this document, it was recalled that: 
‘’[…] the recommendations are of the EU are to focus the objectives of all the 
strategies on getting all children of Roma and Egyptian population to complete 
primary school’’ (Governement of Montenegro 2016, p.27) 
The strategies did show some similarities with those of Macedonia in the sense that they 
alluded to the EU as in influence in general and referenced EU policy prescriptions for 
educational inclusion with similar frequency. However, EU policy documents pertaining to 
Roma inclusion in general were mentioned significantly less often. This was true both in 
terms of paragraphs dedicated (1 in 2012, 2 in 2016) and different documents mentioned 
(only the FNRIS in both strategies). Moreover, the specific importance of Roma inclusion for 
EU accession was less evident in Montenegro. While it was mentioned once in the 2012-2016 
strategy, the connection with EU membership disappeared altogether in its successor. This is 
a notable finding as the perceived necessity of norm implementation for joining the EU is 
what is assumed to incentivize government action more than referencing the EU in general.
 To conclude, the legacy of EU conditionality on Roma educational inclusion efforts 
was considered high in Macedonia and medium in Montenegro. Therefore this condition was 
more favorable towards the implementation of EU Roma education norms in the former. 
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Quality of norms   
 To recall, the norms and policies prescribed to both countries by the EU in the FNRIS 
contained three elements: Member states should 1) ensure primary school completion, 2) 
widen access to quality early childhood education and 3) reduce the number of early school 
leavers from secondary education (European Commission 2011a). In terms of clear 
formulations and unambiguous definitions these goals were considered ‘medium’. While 
being more specific than merely ‘ensuring non-discrimination and social inclusion’, several 
aspects of the way they are presented might obstruct effective norm implementation. Key 
terms such as ‘quality’, ‘early’, and ‘access’ were not elaborated upon. This leaves these 
terms open to interpretation by target state governments, possibly leading to actions and 
policies not in line with the original intent by the EU. For example, if what constitutes quality 
education remains indeterminate, governments might still be incentivized to ‘improve’ Roma 
access by relying on highly segregated schools. With regards to escape clauses, none were 
found in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of The European Union as it foresees no 
exceptional circumstances which can be invoked to deviate from its intentions (European 
Union 2000).           
 Regarding the behavioral implications of the FNRIS discussed earlier, it is judged that 
there was still significant room for discretion. In this regard the Framework more closely 
resembles a set of recommended guidelines for Roma educational inclusion policies rather 
than a specific strategy in itself. As mentioned, it contains the general prescription to ‘’ensure 
that all Roma children have access to quality education’’, but does not present specific steps 
which have to be taken to achieve this goal. Similarly, it contains the recommendation to 
‘’reform teachers’ training curricula and to elaborate innovative teaching methods’, without 
specifying the contents of these reforms and methods (European Commission 2011a, p.5). As 
a result governments might be tempted to interpret these statements according to their own 
preferences, thereby distorting the effective implementation of Roma educational inclusion 
norms. Therefore, the room for discretion allowed for by the FNRIS was considered 
‘medium/high’ in both cases, decreasing likelihood of effective implementation.  
 In sum, the quality of Roma educational inclusion norms transferred to Macedonia and 
Montenegro was considered low to medium. While these norms clearly addressed Roma 
educational inclusion, they lacked specificity and clarity. Consequently, the characteristics of 
EU norms themselves might have contributed to the observed implementation deficits in these 
states.  
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Normative resonance  
 Public opinion on Roma educational inclusion as measured in support for affirmative 
measures - promoting opportunities for equal access to Roma population when applying for 
education - was generally favorable towards norm implementation in both cases. An overview 
of the relevant data from the Balkan Public Barometer is presented in Appendix E1. For the 
available years, 2016-2018, between 69 and 71 percent of the respondents in Macedonia 
‘tended to agree’ or ‘totally agreed’ with the statement that the government should provide 
such affirmative measures. Of the remaining people between 12 and 15 percent disagreed 
‘totally’. In comparison, the public in Montenegro was even more supportive of Roma-
specific affirmative action in the area of education. Here the percentage agreeing with the 
statement was also relatively stable at 79-81 percent. Furthermore, only 3-6 percent responded 
that they totally disagreed with the state provision of these measures (Regional Cooperation 
Council 2019). This shows that the wider public in both countries was, at least in principle, 
not opposed to measures promoting Roma educational inclusion. Comparatively, conditions 
were more favorable in Montenegro.       
 However, when these findings were corroborated with the ECRI assessments of racism 
and discrimination in both countries a slight discrepancy between the two was found. An 
overview of this content analysis is presented in Appendix H. In short, the ECRI has reported 
more frequently on occurrences of discriminatory practices towards Roma in Montenegro 
than in Macedonia. In case of the latter, the 2013 Conclusions mentioned the practice of 
‘’sending Roma children to educational facilities for pupils with a mental disability’’ (ECRI 
2013, p.5), and the 2016 Report noted that ‘’Roma have been subject to racist profiling at the 
border’’ (ECRI 2016, p.9). Apart from those statements however, discrimination against 
Roma was not mentioned. In Montenegro on the other hand, both the 2012 and 2017 Report 
allocated multiple paragraphs to discrimination against Roma, including in education. Most 
notably, in 2012 the ECRI dedicated 6 paragraphs to discriminatory practices toward Roma in 
education alone. Moreover, in the next Report it commented that negative perceptions of, and 
prejudices towards, Roma were ‘’deeply rooted in society’’ (ECRI 2017, p.26). In sum, these 
findings indicate that normative resonance was low to medium in Macedonia and low in 
Montenegro.           
 These ECRI assessments therefore suggest that the Roma educational inclusion 
indicators in the Balkan Public barometer either contain a bias (for example because they are 
self-reported) or do not cover the full scope of ‘norms on Roma educational inclusion’. In 
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both cases, the judgment on whether this condition was more favorable in Macedonia or 
Montenegro is indeterminate.  
Administrative capacity  
 An overview of the data on administrative capacities is presented in Appendix I. The 
interpretation of these scores and percentile ranks of Macedonia and Montenegro on the 
Government Effectiveness Index depends on the group of countries that is used for reference. 
For example, both countries scored above average if compared to all countries in the dataset. 
The indicative percentile rank (i.e. the percentage of countries with a lower score) for 
Macedonia averaged 55.67 compared to 59.83 for Montenegro. However, in comparison with 
EU member states (1.07) their average governance scores can be considered low: 0.05 for 
Macedonia and 0.16 for Montenegro (World Bank, 2019b). As administrative capacity for 
norm implementation is needed to implement EU policies, this comparison will be used for 
the assessment. Therefore, administrative capacity in both countries is considered to be low, 
making this condition not favorable to norm implementation. Compared among each other, 
administrative capacities were very slightly higher in Montenegro, but on the whole this 
condition was considered to be equally favorable to the Europeanization of Roma educational 
inclusion in both cases 
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Discussion 
An overview of the indicators analyzed and the degree to which they are favorable to the 
Europeanization of Roma educational inclusion in Macedonia and Montenegro is presented in 
Table 3. This visual representation is based on a more detailed summary of the findings that 
can be found in Appendix J.         
   
In both cases three indicators were favorable, and two were slightly favorable to 
Europeanization of Roma educational inclusion, on a total of 26 indicators analyzed. This in 
line with the general expectation that the slow progress made towards Roma educational 
inclusion in these countries has been accompanied by the absence of many of the conditions 
Table 3. 
Overview of the presence of conditions favorable to Europeanization of Roma educational inclusion in 
Macedonia (MKD) and Montenegro (MNE) 
Process Condition  MKD         MNE 
Rule Transfer Significance of rewards Final rewards    
 Intermediate rewards    
 Proximity    
 Determinacy Specificity conditions    
  Specificity behavioural implications    
  Legalized status    
  Feedback & monitoring    
  Salience for EU accession    
 Credibility of rewards EU internal consensus    
  Coherence & consistency    
  of threats Added value    
  Sunk costs    
  Bilateral alternatives    
  Cross-conditionality    
 Adoption costs Risk of electoral losses    
  Opinion on proximity accession    
  Veto-players    
Norm 
Implementation 
Legacy of conditionality Influence EU on strategy    
Reference to EU norms    
Reference to FNRIS targets    
Quality of norms Clarity    
 Room for discretion    
 Escape clauses    
Normative resonance Opinion on educational inclusion    
 ECRI mentions of discrimination    
Administrative  capacity Government effectiveness    
 Favorable 
 Slightly favorable 
 Neutral 
 Slightly unfavorable 
 Unfavorable 
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for successful rule transfer and norm implementation. A few observations can be made from 
these general findings. Firstly, the only condition for which no indicators were found to be 
unfavorable to Europeanization was adoption costs. This might imply that at least for the 
process of rule transfer, the deficiencies in Europeanization of Roma inclusion originate from 
characteristics of the relationship between the EU and the candidate state rather than domestic 
conditions. Moreover the findings show that a significant final reward and favorable domestic 
conditions are not jointly sufficient conditions for rule transfer to occur. Secondly credibility, 
especially of threats was conducive towards rule transfer on none of the indicators measured. 
However, as the theory did not prescribe relative importance to individual conditions, it is 
difficult to determine its exact contribution to the success of rule transfer. What can be 
inferred is that it is not a necessary condition, as the legacy of conditionality in Macedonia 
showed that at least some norms were transferred into its domestic strategy. Lastly, significant 
obstacles to Europeanization were observed in both rule transfer and norm implementation. 
This confirms that a theoretical explanation of deficiencies in the Europeanization of Roma 
educational inclusion should include both sub-processes.  
 However, when comparing the findings for Macedonia and Montenegro, support for 
the theoretical expectation that progress in Roma educational inclusion in the former can be 
explained by the presence of more conditions favorable to Europeanization in general was not 
found. In fact, only for three indicators did the analysis show more advantageous 
circumstances in Macedonia. In comparison, Montenegro performed better on six indicators. 
For the remaining 17 indicators findings were either identical or different only to a degree that 
was judged to be too insignificant to have a meaningful influence on the Europeanization 
process. Drawing inferences from these results is difficult, as the research design used in this 
study cannot account for why these findings deviate from the theoretical expectations. 
 The condition ‘legacy of conditionality’ serves as an example here: overall the 
conditions for rule transfer in the area of Roma educational inclusion where slightly less 
favorable in Macedonia due to the (lack of) proximity and credibility of their membership 
prospect. The theory prescribes in this instance that Macedonia will be less likely to adopt EU 
norms and that the outcomes of the Europeanization of Roma educational inclusion will be 
lower. However, when analyzing the influence of the EU on national Roma strategies, it was 
found that the Macedonian government actually invoked EU norms significantly more 
frequent. This could possibly indicate that the relationship between the two established in the 
literature a) does not apply to Roma educational inclusion or b) is influenced by one or more 
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conditions not present in this model. Alternatively, it could also be theorized that there is 
actually an inverse relationship between the likelihood of accession and progress in Roma 
educational inclusion. In this line of thinking the fact that Macedonia has not opened 
negotiations yet might incentivize them to show more progress towards compliance with EU 
norms in order to progress to this stage. But although it was impossible to ascertain which of 
these was responsible for this observation, each would warrant a reconsideration of this aspect 
of the theory of Europeanization.  
 In sum, the findings neither confirm nor completely disconfirm the theory but reveal 
that it might need to be adjusted to account for the observed outcomes of Europeanization in 
specific policy areas or between countries with similar external incentives from the EU. The 
concluding section of this study will further address these issues as well as reflect on the 
research method in general.     
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Conclusion 
This research has tried to explain the progress made towards Roma educational 
inclusion in Macedonia and Montenegro by critically examining the conditions determining 
the success of Europeanization in this area as identified in the existing literature. It has done 
so by combining the theories of rule transfer and norm implementation into one theoretical 
framework. Through the identification and specification of indicators for each condition, it 
has offered a more reliable way of measuring cross-case Europeanization than has been 
provided in the existing literature. While finding support for the general deficiency in Roma 
educational inclusion in both countries, the conditions failed to predict the different outcomes 
observed in the Regional Roma Surveys. This has at least two potential theoretical 
implications for the study of Europeanization in candidate states in general, and for 
Europeanization of Roma (educational) inclusion specifically. First of all, taking into account 
the similar or identical findings on many of the indicators analyzed, the model seems less 
useful when comparing countries with similar external incentives on one specific issue area. 
The general nature of the framework extends its applicability to many different cases, but 
might thereby lose the power to predict very specific outcomes. Consequently, the model 
might be more appropriate for explaining different outcomes between candidate states and 
associate states, or between processes of Europeanization over time. Second, the fact that the 
observed outcome could not be fully accounted for shows that the current models might not 
cover the full scope of conditions and actors relevant to the process of Europeanization.  
 However, the research as presented here also had some limitations inherent to its 
method. First of all, as mentioned when discussing the results, it does not allow for drawing 
inferences on why the findings did not conform to what was expected from the theory. No 
rival explanations of the observed outcomes could be tested within the scope of this study, 
and therefore the results cannot provide a conclusive explanation of the causal processes 
involved in the Europeanization of Roma educational inclusion.    
 Second, it has assumed the additivity of the conditions analyzed in explaining the 
observed outcome, i.e. that they affect progress made in Roma educational inclusion 
independently from each other. While this increases the parsimony of the model, this 
assumption might be questioned on the grounds that there are interaction effects between 
some conditions. For example, it could be theorized that the impact of the condition ‘salience 
of EU conditions for the accession process’ on rule transfer is decided by the expected 
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‘consistency in applying conditionality’. This would change the interpretation of the results in 
that a change only in the former might then be inconsequential for the observed outcome. This 
can be seen as part of a trade-off made within this research project between examining a large 
amount of conditions and explaining detailed causal processes. Another consequence of this 
trade-off is that the study inevitably loses some depth of analysis. Limiting the study to a few 
or even a single condition would decrease its internal validity in that it does not take into 
account alternative explanations, but could provide valuable in-depth knowledge. 
 The third limitation arises from the impact of choices made in data selection on the 
measurement validity. Some of the conditions for Europeanization, most notably credibility, 
are partly determined by the perceptions and interpretations of domestic policymakers. An 
obvious example is the credibility of the promise of the EU to award membership if a country 
complies with its membership conditionality. To measure this condition, this study has partly 
relied on a proxy measure: public opinion on the importance of Roma integration for EU 
accession. While this choice can de defended, it does assume the public opinion reflects that 
of policymakers or at least influences it. This is however not a given and can be challenged 
To address these limitations, as well as the theoretical implications described earlier, 
further research should take into account the following recommendations. To test the external 
validity of the result of this study, the framework used in this study should be applied to other 
specific issue areas and in comparative analyses involving different states. Of particular 
interest here would be a comparison involving countries with membership perspectives that 
are a lot dimmer, such as Kosovo or Turkey. From a methodological perspective, this line of 
research will likely benefit greatly from an approach that can capture the perceptions of 
policymakers more accurately. While one possibility would be to analyze the political 
discourse on EU accession and Roma integration by studying political speeches or other 
forms of communication, the most fruitful way to accomplish this will likely involve semi-
structured interviews with state or local government officials. While some attempts in this 
direction have been undertaken recently for corroborating data collected from elsewhere, a 
more theory-guided approach to interviews is desirable. Theoretically, this research has 
highlighted the need to take into account alternative explanations of Europeanization, such as 
the lesson-drawing or social learning model. These ‘bottom-up’ models can prove especially 
valuable when the results from rationalist models are inconclusive, as is the case here, but 
also have merit in their own right. Lastly, in light of possible alternative explanations not 
accounted for within the ‘top-down’ model employed here, in-depth case studies using 
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methods of process tracing could reveal different conditions and actors important for 
successful Europeanization. 
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Appendix A Changes in Roma educational Inclusion in Macedonia and Montenegro  
In interpreting this data, a significant increase in ‘percentage of students attending majority 
Roma schools (ages 7-15)’ or ‘percentage of students attending special schools (ages 7-15)’ 
was coded as a decrease in Roma educational inclusion.  
Table A1 
Changes in Roma educational inclusion in Macedonia compared to their non-Roma neighbours, 2011-
2017 
Indicator 
Roma 
Non-Roma 
neighbours 
2011 2017 Change1 2011 2017 Change1 
Net pre-primary enrollment rate (ages 3-5) 12 10 -2* 26 27 +1 
Adjusted net compulsory education enrollment 
rate (ages 7-15) 
73 78 +5* 90 87 -3 
Compulsory education completion rate (ages 18-
21) 
57 70 +13* 89 93 +4 
Upper secondary education completion rate (ages 
22-25) 
15 32 +17* 74 87 +13* 
Tertiary education completion rate (ages 26-29) 0 3 +3* 25 30 +5 
Percentage of students attending majority Roma 
schools (ages 7-15) 
23 40 +17* 13 12 -1 
Percentage of students attending special schools 
(ages 7-15) 
4 3 -1 4 6 -1 
Source: World Bank (2019) 
1 In percentage points, values with an * are statistically significant at the 10 percent level 
Table A2 
Changes in Roma educational inclusion in Montenegro compared to their non-Roma neighbours, 
2011-2017 
Indicator 
Roma 
Non-Roma 
neighbours 
2011 2017 Change1 2011 2017 Change1 
Net pre-primary enrollment rate (ages 3-5) 9 21 +12* 15 36 +21* 
Adjusted net compulsory education enrollment 
rate (ages 7-15) 
56 62 +6* 95 92 -3 
Compulsory education completion rate (ages 18-
21) 
34 34 0 94 97 +3 
Upper secondary education completion rate (ages 
22-25) 
6 3 -3 89 79 -9* 
Tertiary education completion rate (ages 26-29) 0 0 0 15 25 +10 
Percentage of students attending majority Roma 
schools (ages 7-15) 
8 15 +6* 1 13 -12* 
Percentage of students attending special schools 
(ages 7-15) 
6 1 -5* 3 2 -1 
Source: World Bank (2019) 
1 In percentage points, values with an * are statistically significant at the 10 percent level 
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Appendix B Overview of data selected for analysis 
Condition Source Data (year) 
Significance of rewards European Commission EC President Juncker’s Political Guidelines Speech (2014) 
- Speech that sets out the Commission’s plans for the period 2014-2019. Used to assess 
the proximity of EU accession which partly determines the significance of the reward 
  Montenegro (Progress) Reports (2011-2018) 
Macedonia (Progress) Reports (2011-2018) 
- Annually issued reports monitoring the process made towards accession to the EU. 
Expected to contain data membership perspectives and on indeterminate rewards if 
present 
  
  Western Balkans Strategy (2018) 
- Strategic document setting out the priorities for EU enlargement and association in the 
Western Balkans. It was expected that rewards for Europeanization would be 
mentioned here 
Determinacy 
 
European Commission Framework for National Roma Strategies (FNRIS) (2011) 
- The FNRIS was used to assess the specificity of conditions and behavioral implications. 
Although the Framework was mainly an internal EU policy tool, it has in partnership 
with the Regional Cooperation Council been extended to the Western Balkan region. A 
first screening of national policy documents confirmed that this document is perceived 
as an important source of EU conditionality in the area of Roma integration. Therefore, 
prescriptions and recommendations contained therein are judged to be part of the 
conditions regarding Roma educational inclusion. The Framework was analyzed using 
content analysis 
  Montenegro (Progress) Reports (2011-2018) 
Macedonia (Progress) Reports (2011-2018) 
- Progress Reports were used to examine both ‘feedback and monitoring’ and to analyze 
the ‘salience of the conditions for accession’. The latter was done through methods of 
content analysis. 
  
Credibility 
 
European Commission Eurobarometer 76, 78, 80, 82, 84, 86, 88, 90 (2011-2018) 
- Survey measures from the autumn editions of the semi-annual EU-wide Eurobarometer 
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of public support in EU member states for further enlargement was were used as a 
proxy measure for the credibility of rewards 
  Montenegro – EU Factograph (2019) 
North Macedonia – EU Factograph (2019) 
- These factographs on EU-Western Balkan economic relations were used to determine 
added value to the EU, bilateral alternatives and sunk costs. These are indicators for the 
threat by the EU to withhold membership when conditions are met 
  
 European Parliament Montenegro – Economic indicators and trade with the EU (2018) 
North Macedonia – Economic indicators and trade with the EU (2018) 
- These reports on EU-Western Balkan economic relations were used to determine added 
value to the EU, bilateral alternatives and sunk costs. These are indicators for the threat 
by the EU to withhold membership when conditions are met 
  
 Regional Cooperation Council Balkan Public Barometer (2019) 
- Survey data on the perceived importance of Roma integration for EU accession was 
taken from the annual Balkan Public Barometer, using their interactive dataset. This 
perceived importance is assumed to influence the threat to withhold membership by the 
EU if conditions (i.e. improvements in Roma educational inclusion) are not met. If 
these are deemed irrelevant, countries are not incentivized to improve Roma 
educational inclusion as they believe the EU will pay out with the reward regardless. 
Adoption costs European Commission Eurobarometer 76, 78, 80, 82, 84, 86, 88, 90 (2011-2014) 
- Risks of electoral losses were measured by taking survey data on public opinion in 
Macedonia and Montenegro on EU membership from the autumn editions of the semi-
annual Eurobarometer survey until 2014. This cross-national measure allows for a 
meaningful cross-case comparison. 
 Manifesto Project Manifesto Project Database 
- Data on veto-players were taken from the Manifesto Project Database, which has coded 
the positions of parties in Macedonia and Montenegro and a wide variety of issues 
including EU integration. All parties present in the (coalition) governments and the 
executive were considered. 
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 Regional Cooperation Council Balkan Public Barometer (2019) 
- Risks of electoral losses were measured by taking survey data on public opinion in 
Macedonia and Montenegro on EU membership from Balkan Public Barometer for the 
years 2015-2018. In 2015 this survey replaced the Eurobarometer for the countries of 
the Western Balkans. This cross-national measure allows for a meaningful cross-case 
comparison. 
Legacy of 
conditionality 
Government of Montenegro Strategy for Improving the Position of the Roma and Egyptian in Montenegro 2012-2016 
(2012) 
  The Strategy for Inclusion of Roma and Egyptians in Montenegro 2016-2020 (2016) 
- A content analysis of national Roma strategies was used to determine the influence of 
EU on policy-making, the reference to EU norms, and the reference to FNRIS targets in 
Montenegro.  
 Government of Macedonia Strategy for the Roma in the Republic of Macedonia (2004) 
Strategy for the Roma in the Republic of Macedonia (2014) 
- A content analysis of national Roma strategies was used to determine the influence of 
EU on policy-making, the reference to EU norms, and the reference to FNRIS targets in 
Macedonia. 
 
Quality of norms European Commission 
 
Framework for National Roma Strategies (FNRIS) (2011) 
- The FNRIS was used to assess the clarity and specificity of EU norms, as it is the 
document that forms the basis for policy prescriptions made by the EU regarding 
improving Roma educational inclusion. 
 European Union EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000) 
- The Charter provides the legal framework for the norms enshrined in the FNRIS, and 
will therefore be used to assess the existence of escape clauses. 
Normative resonance European Commission against 
Racism and Intolerance 
ECRI Reports on Montenegro (2012, 2017) 
ECRI Reports on Macedonia (2013, 2016) 
- A content analysis of mentions of racism and discrimination against Roma (including in 
education) in ECRI Reports was used to measure the presence of anti-Roma norms. The 
ECRI is a monitoring body of the Council of Europe. An initial screening of these 
reports revealed that they indeed cover discrimination against Roma separately 
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 Regional Cooperation Council  Balkan Public Barometer (2019) 
- Normative resonance was also determined based on the public attitudes towards Roma 
and their integration into the education system as expressed in the ‘attitudes to social 
inclusion of vulnerable groups’ indicators from the Balkan Public Barometer, available 
since 2015. 
Administrative capacity World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (2019) 
- Administrative capacity was assessed using the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, which is a composite index measure based on data from survey institutes, 
think-tanks, NGO’s, and international organizations. The specific indicator used, 
‘government effectiveness’ reflects the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, as well as the quality of the civil service and public services (World 
Bank 2019b). 
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Appendix C Veto-players’ positions on European integration  
The term veto-players entails ‘’all institutional or societal actors with the capacity to block 
[EU rule] adoption’’ (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2019, p.5).  This was understood the 
attitudes of all political parties of the governing coalition (as well the head of state in case of 
Macedonia as it has a presidential system) on the EU.  It was measured using two indicators 
from the Manifesto Project, which has systematically coded election manifestos to allow for 
cross-case comparison. These indicators were: 
per108: European Community/Union: Positive 
Favourable mentions of European Community/Union in general. May include the: 
- Desirability of the manifesto country joining(or remaining a member); 
- Desirability of expanding the European Community/Union 
- Desirability of increasing the ECs/EUs competences 
- Desirability of expanding the competences of the European Parliament 
per110: European Community/Union: Negative 
Negative references to the European Community/Union. May include: 
- Opposition to specific European policies which are preferred by European authorities 
- Opposition to the net-contribution of the manifesto country to the EU budget 
All parties in the governing coalitions were considered. However, in the analysis the 
percentage of seats won by each party was taken into account as this was assumed to correlate 
with a stronger position during coalition negotiations. This in turn would increase the 
likelihood that the position of this party will determine the adoption of EU rules. By using 
data from election manifestos, it was furthermore assumed that these will reflect the decisions 
made by the governments once in power.  Parties with zero seats were part of the coalition 
running up to the election, but ran independently from the other parties and were not voted 
into parliament. They were included for the sake of completeness but their political leverage 
is assumed to be negligible. The party with an * held the presidency during that parliamentary 
term. 
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Table C1. 
Coalition parties’ positions on European Integration 2011-2018 in Macedonia as expressed in 
election manifestos 
Government Party/coalition (% 
of seats)1 
108 European 
Community/Union: 
Positive 
110 European 
Community/Union: 
Negative 
2011-2014 VMRO-DPMNE* 
(45.5) 
1.043 0 
 DOM (0) 2.338 0 
 BDI1 (12.5) 3.676 0 
    
2014-2016 VMRO-DPMNE* 
(49.6) 
0.715 0 
 DOM (0) 1.069 0 
 BDI (15.8) - - 
    
2017-2019 SDSM (40.8) 1.515 0 
 DOM (0) 0.807 0 
 BDI (8.3) 2.762 0 
 AfA (2.5) 0.948 0 
    
Presidency: VMRO-DPMNE* 0.77 0 
Source: International Foundation for Electoral Systems (2019). Republic of North Macedonia Election Guide, retrieved from 
http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/128/; Manifesto Project (2019), retrieved from https://visuals.manifesto-
project.wzb.eu/mpdb-shiny/cmp_dashboard_dataset/.  
1 Data for the BDI from 2011 was missing from the database 
  
Table C2. 
Coalition parties’ positions on European Integration 2011-2018 in Montenegro as expressed in 
election manifestos 
Government Party/coalition (% of 
seats) 
108 European 
Community/Union: 
Positive 
110 European 
Community/Union: 
Negative 
2009-2012 Coalition for a 
European Montenegro 
8.929 0 
 (59.2)   
    
2012-2016 Coalition for a 
European Montenegro 
(50.1)  
1.504 0 
    
2016-present DPS/LPCG (44.4) 5.222 0 
 SDCG (1.2) 2.793 0 
 Bosniak Party (2.4) 1.241 0 
Source: International Foundation for Electoral Systems (2019) Montenegro Election Guide, retrieved from 
http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/245/ Manifesto Project (2019), retrieved from https://visuals.manifesto-
project.wzb.eu/mpdb-shiny/cmp_dashboard_dataset/.  
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Appendix D Determinacy of Roma general- and educational inclusion in EC Progress Reports 
For assessing determinacy, Commission reports on Macedonia and Montenegro were first searched for mentions of ‘Roma’. In case of 
Montenegro, it was found that this group was sometimes referred to as RAE (Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians), and therefore this was also used as 
a search term. Next, paragraphs were coded as either relating to Roma inclusion in general or relating to Roma educational inclusion specifically. 
 To recall, the theory prescribes that high determinacy is reflected by mentions of words such as ‘crucial’ or ‘essential’, i.e. stressing that 
the condition is non-negotiable. However, an initial screening of the reports found that they refrain from using such language altogether, even in 
areas which might be deemed more important to accession (such as market harmonization). Therefore, the determinacy in language used was 
operationalized as a sentence containing a ‘prescription by the EU that a certain action to be undertaken or policy to be adopted’. As a result, 
criticisms by the Commission of policies or actions of governments were not included. Data from 2017 is missing as no Reports on the progress 
of Macedonia and Montenegro towards accession were published that year. 
Table D1 
Determinacy of Roma educational inclusion in EC Progress Reports for Macedonia, 2011-2019 
Year 
Roma inclusion general 
mentioned (paragraphs) 
Roma educational 
inclusion mentioned 
(paragraphs) 
Determinacy1 
2011 5 0 - ‘’Roma continue to face very difficult living conditions and discrimination and 
additional efforts are necessary.’’ 
- ‘’Overall, the potential of [Roma] social policies still needs to be fostered.’’ 
- ‘’The implementation of the Roma Strategy and its action plans needs to be 
strengthened.’’ 
2012 1 0 - 
2013 3 2 - ‘’The Roma strategy needs to be proactively implemented.’’ 
2014 3 2 - ‘’Continued efforts are needed to address concerns about prejudice and 
discrimination against the Roma population.’’ 
2015 3 1 - ‘’ [..] poverty remains a problem, in particular for the Roma. Anti-discrimination 
mechanisms need to be strengthened.’’ 
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- ‘’However, the root causes [of Roma socioeconomic deprivation] require greater 
structural efforts.’’ 
2016 5 3 - ‘’ [..] the country should in particular: ensure that appropriate institutional and 
financial resources are made available to implement the existing social inclusion, 
the Roma action plan and poverty alleviation strategies.’’ 
- ‘’Cooperation is needed between the social protection, education and health 
services.’’ 
- ‘’ [..] but much still needs to be done to improve social inclusion of the Roma.’’ 
- ‘’However, the root causes [of Roma socioeconomic deprivation] require greater 
structural efforts.’’ 
- ‘’In the coming year, the country should in particular improve access to quality 
education for all, in particular [..] children from Roma communities.’’ 
2018 5 5 - ‘’More efforts are needed as regards Roma inclusion.’’ 
- ‘’The country should, in particular, adopt and start implementing the draft Law on 
protection and prevention against discrimination.’’ 
- ‘’Much still needs to be done on Roma inclusion’’ 
- ‘’Roma enrollment in pre-school education is low and must become a priority’’ 
- ‘’Roma health and education mediators must work better’’ 
- ‘’Ensure that appropriate institutional and financial resources are provided to 
implement the social inclusion policies including the Roma action plans [..] ‘’ 
2019 2 4 - ‘’In the coming year, the country should in particular: improve access to quality 
education for all, in particular preschool enrollment [..] children from Roma 
communities.’’ 
- ‘’Substantial improvement is still needed in the quality of primary and secondary 
[Roma] education’’ 
- ‘’The Ministry of Labour and Social Policy adopted a decision requiring 
municipalities to cover all pre-school costs for enrolled Roma children. Compliance 
with this important measure should be closely monitored’’ 
Source: European Commission (2011-2019) 
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Table D2 
Determinacy of Roma educational inclusion in EC Progress Reports for Montenegro, 2011-2019 
Year Roma inclusion general 
mentioned (paragraphs) 
Roma educational 
inclusion mentioned 
(paragraphs) 
Determinacy1 
2011 4 1 - ‘’Scholarships and other forms of financial support are available for RAE students, 
however it needs to be strengthened and mainstreamed [..] ‘’ 
- ‘’Additional efforts are needed to ensure the social integration of Roma, Ashkali 
and Egyptians.’’ 
2012 8 2 - ‘’ [..] inclusion of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians needs to be improved.’’ 
- ‘’Measures and policies for poverty reduction and for Roma inclusion need to be 
strengthened.’’ 
- ‘’ [..] inclusion of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians needs to be improved.’’ 
2013 2 1 - 
2014 6 5 - ‘’Discrimination against Roma and their political underrepresentation needs to be 
addressed’’ 
2015 2 1 - 
2016 3 2 - ‘’The 2016-2020 strategy for social inclusion of Roma and Egyptian population 
together with its 2016 action plan were adopted in March, but more needs to be 
done regarding the social inclusion of Roma.’’  
- ‘’Measures should be taken to address the high dropout rate of Roma children at 
national level education.’’ 
- ‘’Efforts to provide adequate support services for [Roma] children with special 
education needs should continue.’’ 
2018 3 1 - ‘’Montenegro should in particular: ensure effective implementation of [..] the 
rights of the child and Roma rights.’’ 
2019 2 2 - ‘’Montenegro should in particular: ensure effective implementation of [..] the 
rights of the child and Roma rights.’’ 
- ‘’To ensure that they [Roma] remain in school, and learn and progress, stronger 
support is required, including reinforcing positive measures already taken such as 
longer preparatory pre-school, free textbooks, and scholarships.’’ 
Source: European Commission (2011-2019) 
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Appendix E Public opinion on EU membership and Roma integration  
Public opinion on Roma integration in Macedonia and Montenegro 
For this indicator it was assumed that attitudes towards equal access for Roma when applying 
for secondary education or university can be equated with affirmative measures towards 
Roma educational inclusion in general. For the sake of a more concise analysis it was chosen 
to aggregate the data for ‘totally disagree’ and ‘tend to disagree’, as well as those for ‘tend to 
agree’ and ‘totally agree’. However, analyzing each answer separately would have led to the 
same interpretation.           
 In 2019 the Balkan Public Barometer added the question ‘How likely is it that you are 
comfortable with your children going to school with Roma children?’. However, the time 
period demarcated in this study did not allow for taking this otherwise highly relevant 
indicator into account in the analysis. These findings are nevertheless considered relevant 
enough to be described briefly here. In Macedonia, 13 percent was ‘uncomfortable’ with this, 
18 percent was ‘somewhat uncomfortable, 24 percent was ‘somewhat comfortable, and 39 
was ‘comfortable’. For Montenegro, these figures were 12 percent, 14 percent, 42 percent and 
25 percent. Therefore, if it had been taken into account, it would not have changed the 
judgment made on public attitudes toward Roma educational inclusion 
Table E1. 
Opinion on the statement: ‘’the Government should provide affirmative measures – promote 
opportunities for equal access to Roma population when applying for a secondary school or 
university’’, in Macedonia (percentages) 
Country Year 
Totally 
disagree 
Tend to 
disagree 
Tend to 
agree 
Totally 
agree 
DK/refuse 
Macedonia 2016 12 15 36 34 3 
2017 11 15 38 33 3 
2018 15 13 35 34 3 
Montenegro 2016 3 11 30 51 5 
 2017 5 9 48 31 7 
 2018 6 8 47 31 9 
Source: Regional Cooperation Council (2019). Balkan Public Barometer. Retrieved from 
https://www.rcc.int/seeds/results/2/balkan-public-barometer 
 
Public opinion on the importance of Roma integration for EU accession.  
Table E2. 
Response to the question ‘’How important would you assess the issue of integration of Roma for EU 
accession?’’ in Macedonia and Montenegro (percentages) 
Country Year 
Not important 
at all 
Not very 
important 
Important 
Very 
Important 
Highly 
Important 
Macedonia 2017 11 23 37 20 9 
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2018 17 14 34 24 11 
Montenegro 2017 12 23 41 18 5 
 2018 10 17 33 34 5 
Source: Regional Cooperation Council (2019). Balkan Public Barometer. Retrieved from 
https://www.rcc.int/seeds/results/2/balkan-public-barometer 
 
Public opinion on EU membership in Macedonia and Montenegro 
For this indicator, findings were combined from the Eurobarometer (2011-2014) and the 
Balkan Public Barometer (2015-2018). The questions used in both surveys were identical. For 
determining its effects on the adoption of EU rules, it was assumed that only an explicitly 
negative view of the EU (‘Bad thing’) will cause the public to be opposed to this. 
Table E3. 
Reply to the survey question ‘’Do you think that EU membership would be a good thing, a bad thing, 
or neither good nor bad?’’, in Macedonia (percentages)  
Year Good thing Neither good nor bad Bad thing DK/refuse 
2011 62 25 11 2 
2012 57 26 14 3 
2013 50 28 18 4 
2014 51 30 18 1 
2015 41 42 15 2 
2016 47 36 15 2 
2017 54 33 11 2 
2018 59 28 11 2 
Source: European Commission (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014). Standard Eurobarometer. Retrieved from 
https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/home/; Regional Cooperation Council (2019). Balkan Public Barometer. Retrieved from 
https://www.rcc.int/seeds/results/2/balkan-public-barometer 
 
Table E4. 
Reply to the survey question ‘’Do you think that EU membership would be a good thing, a bad thing, 
or neither good nor bad?’’, in Montenegro (percentages)  
Year Good thing Neither good nor bad Bad thing DK/refuse 
2011 47 31 14 8 
2012 50 29 13 8 
2013 44 33 17 6 
2014 51 31 17 1 
2015 35 37 23 6 
2016 38 33 18 10 
2017 44 29 22 5 
2018 53 28 10 9 
Source: European Commission (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014). Standard Eurobarometer. Retrieved from 
https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/home/; Regional Cooperation Council (2019). Balkan Public Barometer. Retrieved from 
https://www.rcc.int/seeds/results/2/balkan-public-barometer 
 
Public opinion on the proximity of EU accession 
When interpreting these results, it was taken into account that the answers ‘by 2020’, ‘by 
2025’ and ‘by 2030’ were used in each survey and therefore reflected a different expected 
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proximity to accession. Therefore, a decline in the percentage of respondents thinking 
accession will happen ‘by 2020’ does not necessarily reflect  a decline in the percentage of 
people who think accession will happen in five years as was the case in the 2015 survey. 
Table E5 
Reply to the survey question ‘’In general, when do you expect the accession to EU to happen’’, in 
Macedonia and Montenegro (percentages) 
Country Year By 2020 By 2025 By 2030 Never DK/Refuse 
Macedonia 2015 24 24 17 25 9 
 2016 26 25 16 28 5 
 2017 25 24 15 28 9 
 2018 23 29 13 22 13 
Montenegro 2015 33 22 12 23 10 
 2016 36 21 8 14 20 
 2017 28 28 13 17 14 
 2018 13 40 14 12 21 
Source: Regional Cooperation Council (2019). Balkan Public Barometer. Retrieved from 
https://www.rcc.int/seeds/results/2/balkan-public-barometer 
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Appendix F Public opinion on future enlargement of the EU in EU member states 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F1. 
Opinion on the ‘’Future enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years’’ in EU 
member states (aggregated, percentages) 
Year For Against DK 
2011 38 53 10 
2012 38 52 10 
2013 37 52 11 
2014 39 48 13 
2015 38 51 11 
2016 39 51 10 
2017 42 47 11 
2018 43 45 12 
Source: European Commission (2011-2018). Standard Eurobarometer. Retrieved from https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/home 
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Appendix G Influence of EU conditionality on national Roma strategies 
For measuring the influence of EU norms and rules on national Roma strategies, the first step 
was to isolate the introductory and concluding general section on Roma inclusion and the 
section dedicated to education. Next, paragraphs were searched for mentions of ‘EU’, 
‘European Union’, ‘European Commission’ and ‘European Council’. The decision to code 
paragraphs was made after an initial screening of the documents revealed that they were 
similar in structure and format. The paragraphs were subsequently manually coded according 
to the operationalization of the different aspects of EU influence on Roma inclusion policies 
in general, and Roma educational inclusion policies specifically, outlined below. The only 
exception is the ‘amount of different EU policy documents relating to Roma inclusion 
mentioned’, for which the total number of documents was counted regardless of the amount 
of paragraphs dedicated to them. 
Table G1 
Influence of EU conditionality on national Roma strategies in Macedonia and Montenegro 
(paragraphs) 
Operationalization 
Macedonia Montenegro 
2004-
2014 
2014-
2020 
2012-
2016 
2016-
2020 
Mention that the EU has influenced the strategy 
(paragraphs) 
3 2 2 4 
Mention that the EU accession process specifically has 
influenced the strategy1 (paragraphs) 
2 1 1 - 
Reference to EU policy documents on Roma inclusion 
(general, paragraphs) 
4 10 1 2 
Amount of different EU policy documents relating to 
Roma inclusion mentioned (general) 
7 15 1 1 
Reference to EU policy prescriptions/guidelines on Roma 
inclusion (education, paragraphs) 
1 3 0 3 
Reference to  specific EU benchmarks or indicators on 
Roma inclusion (education, paragraphs) 
0 0 0 1 
Source: Government of Montenegro. Ministry of Human and Minority Rights. (2012, 2016); Republic of Macedonia. 
Ministry of Labour and Social Policy (2004, 2014) 
1 This represent a  subcategory of ‘Mention that the EU has influenced the strategy’, therefore paragraphs could be coded as 
both 
 
 
 
 
 
57 
 
Appendix H Discrimination towards Roma in Macedonia and Montenegro 
‘Norms incompatible with Roma educational inclusion’ was operationalized as mentions of 
discriminatory practices towards Roma in ECRI reports on Macedonia and Montenegro 
during 2011-2018. It is important to note that the document for 2013 regarding Macedonia is 
not a full Report, but rather the Conclusions on the implementation of the recommendations 
made in the previous report (which was published before 2011). While it is therefore not fully 
comparable to the other documents it was included here for the sake of completeness. Its 
inclusion did not alter the results of the analysis.      
 The decision to code paragraphs was made based on an initial screening of the reports 
which indicates that they used similar formats. Paragraphs were coded as either 
‘discrimination against Roma, general’ or ‘discrimination against Roma, education’ only if 
they pertained to the observation of discriminatory practices not directly related to 
institutional arrangements or rules. This was done to exclude occurrences in which an actor 
responsible for dealing with a certain issue did not hold norms incompatible with Roma 
inclusion but was merely following instructions. Such instances were not deemed to reflect 
normative resonance as understood in this study. 
Table H1 
ECRI assessment of discrimination towards Roma in Macedonia and Montenegro (paragraphs) 
Country Year Discrimination against Roma, 
general  
Discrimination against Roma, 
education 
Macedonia 2013 0 2 
2016 3 2 
Montenegro 2012 4 7 
 2017 6 4 
Source: ECRI (2012, 2013, 2016, 2017) 
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Appendix I Government Effectiveness Index 
For determining administrative capacities, both the overall scores as well as the percentile 
ranks of Macedonia and Montenegro were used from the Government Effectiveness Index. 
These estimates range from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table I1. 
Government Effectiveness Index: Governance scores and percentile ranks for Macedonia and 
Montenegro in comparison to the EU average, 2011-2018 
Year 
Macedonia Montenegro EU 
Score Percentile rank Score Percentile rank Score 
2011 -0.11 51.66 0.10 59.72 1.08 
2012 -0.07 52.13 0.13 59.72 1.08 
2013 -0.05 53.08 0.16 60.19 1.10 
2014 0.13 59.62 0.27 63.46 1.07 
2015 0.12 58.65 0.16 59.62 1.07 
2016 0.10 57.21 0.13 58.17 1.06 
2017 0.15 58.17 0.18 59.62 1.05 
2018 0.09 55.77 0.13 58.17 1.05 
Average 
(2011-2018) 
0.05 - 0.16 - 1.07 
Source: World Bank (2019a) 
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Appendix J Overview of conditions for Europeanization of Roma educational inclusion 
Table J1. 
Presence of conditions favorable to Europeanization of Roma educational policy 
Process Condition Indicator 
Country 
Macedonia Montenegro 
Rule transfer Significance of rewards Final rewards High, full membership High, full Membership 
Intermediate rewards None None 
Proximity Low, negotiations not opened: conditions for 
opening were specified 
Low/medium, negotiations opened: 32/35 
chapter opened, 3 chapters closed 
Determinacy 
 
Specificity conditions Progress Reports: Low 
FNRIS: Medium 
Progress Reports: Low 
FNRIS: Medium 
 Specificity behavioral 
implications  
Low, mostly general recommendations Low, mostly general recommendations 
 Legalized status Low, only indirectly: 
- Council Directive 2000/43 
- EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
Low, only indirectly:  
- Council Directive 2000/43 
- EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
 Feedback and monitoring Feedback: High 
Monitoring: Medium 
Feedback: High 
Monitoring: Medium 
 Salience of condition for 
accession process 
Roma inclusion general: Medium/High 
Roma inclusion education: Medium 
Determinacy language: Low/Medium 
Roma inclusion general: Medium/High 
Roma inclusion education: Medium 
Determinacy language: Low/Medium 
Credibility of rewards EU internal consensus on 
enlargement 
Low/Medium Medium 
  Coherence and 
consistency in applying 
conditionality 
Medium  Medium 
 of threats Cross-conditionality Low Low 
  Bilateral alternatives Low: 
- 82% exports to EU, 62,4% imports 
(2018) 
- 78.3 percent of trade is with EU 
(candidate) states, 3.5 with China, 
3.2 with Turkey (2018) 
 
Low: 
- 45% exports to EU, 48.6% imports 
(2018) 
- 75.2 percent of trade is with EU 
(candidate) states, 7.9 with China, 
3.5 with Turkey (2018) 
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  Added value to the EU Low: 
- 0.06 percent of EU-27 GDP (2011), 
0.06 percent of EU-28 GDP (2017) 
- 0.2  percent of EU trade (2018) 
Low: 
- 0.02 percent of EU-27 GDP (2011), 
0.03 percent of EU-28 GDP (2017) 
- 0.03 percent of EU trade (2018) 
  Sunk costs  Low: 
- 1.23 billion in EU pre-accession 
funds 2007-2020 
Low: 
- 525 million in EU pre-accession 
funds 2007-2020 
Adoption costs Risk of electoral losses Low Low 
  Public opinion on 
proximity accession 
Medium Medium 
 
  Veto-players  EU negative: None 
EU positive: Medium 
EU negative: None 
EU positive Medium/High 
Norm 
implementation 
Legacy of conditionality Adoption of EU norms 
and rules 
Importance EU for Strategy: Medium 
 
Reference to EU specific EU norms, laws and 
regulations: High 
 
Reference to FNRIS benchmark: None 
Importance EU for strategy: Low/Medium 
 
Reference to EU specific EU norms, laws and 
regulations: Low/Medium 
 
Reference to FNRIS goal: Once (2016) 
Quality of norms Clarity  Medium Medium 
 Discretionary room High High 
 Escape clauses None None 
Normative resonance Support for Roma 
affirmative action 
Medium/High 
 
High 
 
  ECRI mentions of 
discrimination 
Medium 
- Roma discrimination general:  
o 3 (2016) 
- Roma discrimination education 
o 2 (2016) 
Medium/High 
- Roma discrimination general 
o 4 (2012) 
o 6 (2017) 
- Roma discrimination education 
o 7 (2012) 
o 4 (2017) 
 Administrative capacity Administrative capacity Low: 
- Average score: 0.05 
- Average percentile rank: 55.67 
Low: 
- Average score: 0.16 
- Average percentile rank: 59.83 
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